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Daniela Caruso1
The ‘Justice Deficit’ Debate in EU Private Law: New Directions2
This essay outlines the ongoing debate on the justice deficit of EU private law –the ‘social
justice’ debate – and then points at an underexplored avenue of inquiry that is essential for this
debate to stay meaningful and constructive. Future research should aim to calibrate EU private
law to the socio-economic asymmetries of the EU market, and to counterbalance the uneven
weight of uniform rules, where they appear desirable, with proper compensatory mechanisms.
1. EU Private Law and the Social Justice Critique – The start of private law harmonization at a
supranational level can be conventionally identified with the enactment of the EEC Directive on
Products Liability in 1985. At that point in time, the project could be characterized as one of
convergence between the goal of market harmonization and the goal of promoting social justice
throughout Europe.3 The directive was inspired by the parallel work of the Council of Europe on
the same subject. The thalidomide children, by then come of age, brought to everyone’s attention
the need to redraft the laws of product liability in a way that would induce producers to engage in
ethical manufacturing. The directive was intended by many as a progressive response to
corporate excesses. To be sure, the directive also pursued the competition goal of leveling the
playing field for all manufacturers, forcing them to internalize the same amount of liability costs
everywhere in the market, in Germany as in Greece. But social justice and market goals seemed
to go perfectly together, as if they were two sides of one (valuable) coin.
Over time, however, things proved to be quite different. First, producers’ lobbies used the
national processes of transposition as an opportunity to carve out important exceptions to strict
product liability. Then, in 2002, the Court of Justice of the EU interpreted the directive as
preemptive of more consumer-friendly national rules.4 As a result, the initial ‘embedding’ of tort
law into the social problem of dangerous products by virtue of European legislation turned into
its opposite: a supranational institution forcibly dis-embedding product liability from the socially
conscious fabric of national private laws.5
Today, the project of building the market through private law harmonization continues unabated,
especially in contract law matters. The Commission would certainly like to go back to those
halcyon days when it seemed possible to do both things at once: give the internal market
uniform rules and, in one stroke, click into synch with the dominant social consciousness of
member states’ constituencies. To that goal, the Commission has recently drafted a proposal for a
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Common European Sales Law (CESL) that contains a number of pro-consumer rules for B2C
transactions. The proposed CESL is at the same time a step towards cross-border uniformity (for
those parties who decide to opt for this instrument in their transactions) and a piece of regulation
meant to redress the bargaining imbalance of individual buyers. The list of the limits to private
autonomy enumerated in the CESL is long enough as to displease libertarian commentators,6 but
it fails, nonetheless, to assuage the skepticism of socially oriented scholars. In EU private law –
the skeptics argue – justice is thin. 7 The current acquis of supranational private law might
promote access for all, including persons traditionally unable to take advantage of market
opportunities, 8 but its focus on access (essentially a procedural aspect) makes it inherently
indifferent to substantive distributive outcomes and therefore in tension with the variously
‘embedded’ private laws of the member states.9
The social justice critique of EU private law has gone even further, launching an external attack
on the very idea of an internal market and on its inherent commodification of all things human.
Here is an example of this type of criticism. The adoption of uniform rules for on-line sales of
goods is supposed to increase consumer choice, facilitate the comparison of transparent terms
and product details, foster healthy competition among manufacturers, etc. The fact is, however,
that on-line purchases from distant locations will result in increased transport and larger carbon
footprints; delivery at one’s door-steps will disrupt the salutary habit of getting out of one’s
dwelling and heading to the shopping mall – the modern-day public forum; etc. The success of
on-line markets is, by this account, a loss for Planet Earth and for human interaction. It is,
moreover, the kind of loss that finds no blessing in any form of democratic endorsement.10
2. The New Constructive Turn of the Social Justice Debate – These days, within the social justice
camp, a less critical and more constructive strand is making strides. Its faith in EU private law is
to be found in anti-nationalist politics.11 The revival of xenophobic trends within the European
polity has many social-justice scholars deeply worried about the motivations of Euroskeptics in
private law camps. Opposition to an EU code is in their eyes a symptom of parochialism and fear
of ‘the other.’12 The defense of a state’s own civil code (once explainable in light of multiple
causes, including social justice concerns) has begun to look like a crusade of nationalist identity
6
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against influxes of foreign ideas and persons.13 In this light, a supranational project of private
law harmonization becomes a bulwark of pluralism and inclusion – the ultimate social-justice
manifesto. This strand of the social-justice debate is therefore molding its critique into a
purposeful set of recipes to fix what is currently broken in the Commission’s private law agenda.
The first and by now well-known recipe has to do with democracy. In 2004, while a draft EU
Constitution was being finalized for the peoples of Europe, Martijn Hesselink compiled a list of
private-law questions to be submitted to national parliaments, so as to enhance the transparency
and legitimacy of the EU codification project.14 Several scholars joined in the plea for more
openness and inclusion in the process of private law harmonization. Some work had already been
done to dispel the resilient assumption that private law was technical, a-political, and
inconsequential on distributive grounds.15 Further effort was put into opening the Commission’s
harmonization methods to multiple inputs from private law scholars and stakeholders. The
Commission listened and developed participatory mechanisms, oftentimes co-opting private law
scholars of various political persuasions into the process so as to have multiple views represented
in its expert groups. To be sure, it is not clear that the process, in its present state, can be deemed
democratic in any serious sense, but there is no question that the harmonization of private law no
longer happens behind closed doors in Brussels. A stronger reason to doubt the democracy fix is
that participatory input, per se, cannot lead to socially just laws in the absence of clearly
identified substantive criteria of distributive justice.
The second type of constructive critique comes from linkages between civil codes and
constitutional law. To certain scholars invested in the social justice debate, the process of private
law harmonization needs to be infused with constitutional theory – in particular, with
constitutional pluralism.16 The suggestion is that private law harmonization of the soft type (as
exemplified by the CESL’s optional nature) is indeed desirable, because it allows for the
existence of different suborders of private law, and yet contributes to the realization of a legalpolitical community based on supranational or cosmopolitan values (such as the protection of
weaker parties in market transactions).
The third fix, steeped in the German tradition of Drittwirkung, involves fundamental rights.17
The argument for placing human rights at the heart of EU private law gained strength after the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which elevated the Nice Charter to the status of primary
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legislation. The hope was that such fundamentals as the right to collective bargaining would
counteract the socially devastating force of the Treaty’s market freedoms. The possibilities of
this approach are yet to be explored, but chances are that the principled strength of the charter
will be neutralized by the CJEU’s increasingly refined ‘balancing’ jurisprudence.
3. Regulation as Laissez Faire – A fourth recipe for improving the social justice aspect of EU
private law is in the process of being articulated18 and has not, as yet, coalesced into a manifesto
or school of thought. This recipe may or may not bring fuel for the further supra-nationalization
of private law, but it would certainly enhance the quality of ongoing market studies and perhaps
correct the troublesome strand of CJEU private-law jurisprudence exemplified by Gonzáles
Sánchez (2002). This line of inquiry, which openly espouses redistribution as a plausible (and in
fact ineluctable) component of private law – aims to bring to the table not just a universal
concept of justice, but specific evidence of the uneven impact of uniform private law rules on
divergent socio-economic realities. Regrettably, real differences have so far failed to inform the
private law harmonization process. The empirical studies conducted by the Commission with
regard to consumer preferences, on-line dealings, and purchase patterns have ignored such
crucial facts as (a) the superiority of western brands in the eyes of eastern consumers, which
allows western traders to segment markets and ‘dump’ their goods in the EU periphery;19 (b) the
one-way flow of manufacturing to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which means that “local”
shopping equals, in the periphery, to buying Western products possibly dumped on their
markets; 20 (c) the poor transport infrastructure that hinders delivery of on-line purchases in
certain regions of Europe more than in others;21 etc. This is how a scholar certainly familiar with
such realities describes the impact of European contract terms regulation upon budding CEE
entrepreneurs:
“The level of protection is exceedingly high. […] The costs imposed in particular on small
businesses by complying with these often excessive and sometimes unclear standards and rules
should not be underestimated. If assiduously applied, the results may be devastating for both
employment and business. However, such concerns are apparently not shared by the
Commission. The Regular Progress reports generally follow formal indicators of enforcement,
and praise high numbers of checks and penalties.” 22
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Interestingly, the Commission is not alone in showing indifference to such concerns. In the
Czech Republic, for example, the government has flaunted a ‘highly positive attitude’ towards
the full harmonisation of consumer law.23 This does not mean, however, that the costs associated
with maximal consumer contract regulation are risible or irrelevant. More probably, signing onto
a uniform degree of consumer protection performs a necessary signalling function: it conveys
familiarity with contemporary business practices, comfort with the state of the art, and
willingness to compete on a level playing field. A state busy catching up with old member states
must signal its readiness, and has no choice but to jump onto a regulatory bandwagon already
moving at full speed.
A realist, empirically informed inquiry on the varied impact of uniform market rules has become
crucial in the aftermath of a set of CJEU decisions (Viking24 et al.), all concerning significant
wage differentials among workers in western and CE Europe. No one on the left of the political
spectrum would ever object to the idea of redistributing some wealth from healthier economies to
the periphery of the Union. What is upsetting is that the particular redistribution enabled – say –
by the Viking decision moves wealth from the workers of State A to the worse-off workers of
State B, and at the same time allows the employers of State A to stay in profitable business. In so
far as, within State A, employers as a class are better off than workers, the type of redistribution
enabled by Viking is starkly regressive.25 Viking’s deregulatory effects, seemingly virtuous on
distributive grounds, fail the realist test in a multi-state context.
The time is ripe for asking similar questions in the context of private law harmonization. Just like
Viking’s endorsement of economic freedom for businesses, the imposition of uniform regulatory
constraints may actually steer wealth away from the wrong place. Imagine, for instance, the
following simple scenario: as a result of uniform sales rules, sellers in State B become subject to
the same degree of costs as sellers in State A, but their ability to pass on these costs to consumers
is much lower: their brands – given consumer biases – are less appealing; if they charged higher
prices, consumers would not buy from them. Their margin of profit is thereby reduced, and
would only be made up by a higher sales volume if consumers truly valued the increase in postsale remedies caused by the new law (an effect that cannot be taken for granted). In the end,
consumers everywhere may be better off, but the sellers who have contributed to consumers’
overall welfare are those of State B only. In so far as they are, by definition, of low economic
status vis-à-vis sellers in State A, the transfer of wealth that derives from sales law uniformity is
of the regressive type.
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Just as we duly question, in theory and in practice, the distributive effects of such pro-market
rulings as Viking, we should investigate the distributive impact of pro-consumer rules. The
imposition of uniform contract laws meant to protect the weaker party might seem, conceptually,
the opposite of market freedom, and it is, indeed, regulatory in nature – the sort of regulation that
counts on the enforcement of public rules through private litigation.26 In this context, however,
regulation and market freedom must be handled with equal caution. The uniform regulation of
contact law throughout a socio-economically diverse market shares, in fact, a fundamental
feature of laissez faire – namely, its indifference by design to the socioeconomic diversity of the
market. Ironically, member states experienced the progressive socialization and embedding of
their private laws in the 20th century, but the EU is now reviving the nineteenth-century habit of
insulating the law of private autonomy from the larger question of systemic inequality.27
4. The Way Forward – Empirical studies need to be refined and theoretical models need to be
formulated in light of the structural asymmetries of the European landscape. 28 If regressive
effects emerge at any step of private law harmonization, the current harmonization strategy must
be revisited. Conscious of these dynamics, some scholars have considered shifting from uniform
rules to a much looser system of coordination among different private law systems within a
procedural ‘conflicts’ model,29 and it is plausible that, on a case-by-case basis, this may turn out
to be the best possible option. This is not, however, the only way out of regressive predicaments.
It may still be the case that certain EU-wide contract rules should be put into place to reflect
uniform values such as the protection of weaker parties or the sanctity of post-sale remedies. It
may be necessary, however, to include in the architecture of reform elements of compensation or
reparation for those who stand to lose disproportionately from an otherwise desirable regulatory
intervention. The template for such reparations is to be found in the rich economic and
philosophical foundations of systems theory, postcolonial studies and development economics.
Just like the harmonization of private law rules, but on a much larger scale, the stipulation of
world-wide labor and environmental standards may impose heavier burdens on developing
countries. It is important to be cognizant of such burdens in designing uniform rules, not
because they should be scrapped, but rather because they should be embedded in comprehensive,
and compensatory, trade or transfer regimes.30
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